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Abstract. It is well known that the network protocols frequently used in Internet
and Local Area Networks do not ensure the security level required for current dis-
tributed applications. This is even more crucial for the Grid environment. Therefore
asymmetric cryptography algorithms have been applied in order to secure informa-
tion transmitted over the network. The security level enforced by means of the algo-
rithms is found sufficient, however it introduces additional transmission overhead.
In this paper we describe experiments performed in order to evaluate transmission
efficiency depending on the security level applied.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the Grid can be considered a new technology for sharing diverse re-
sources [10] – computing capability, disk capacity, data etc. The distributed nature
of the Grid assumes neither the existence of any centralized control point nor existing
relationships or trust between entities sharing their resources. However, the sharing
should necessarily be carefully controlled. Resource providers and consumers should
be able to clearly define what resources are shared, under what conditions, who is
allowed to share resources, and who can use them. In order to make coordina-
tion possible Virtual Organizations (VOs) have been defined as a set of individuals
and/or institutions defined by sharing rules [10].
Communication on the Grid is performed by means of broadly available Internet
infrastructure, therefore security of transmitted information is an inherent issue. In
order to ensure the required security level protocols based on cryptography have been
applied. Thus, transmitted data are secured but communication efficiency decreases.
The aim of the research presented in this paper is to estimate the overhead resulting
from the use of cryptographic enforcement of security of transmitted information
depending on different security levels.
2 THREATS TO THE TRANSMISSION AND SECURITY
SOLUTION FOR THE GRID
The distributed nature of the Grid which uses public links to communicate is the
reason for which security of the Grid infrastructure is a complex issue. In order to
make resource sharing coordinated and secure, trust relationships between resource
providers and consumers are required. The relationships are defined by Virtual Orga-
nizations ; however, entities require means to verify the identity and VO membership
of each other. Despite this security requirement users should be able to authenticate
just once when “entering” the Grid and thereafter should be able to access all the
resources they are authorized to use. Data transmitted via the Grid infrastructure
should be secured in order to avoid alteration or eavesdropping. Authenticity, in-
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tegrity and confidentiality of information transmitted between the entities should
also be guaranteed.
The most important security requirements of the Grid infrastructure can be
divided into the following aspects:
• Authentication: the peers of the connection should be identified upon connection
establishment.
• Authenticity and integrity of transmitted information should be guaranteed in
order to avoid accidental or deliberated alteration.
• Confidentiality of transmitted data should be guaranteed to prevent eavesdrop-
ping.
• Single sign-on should be enabled in order to facilitate resource exploitation.
Vulnerabilities of protocols widely used on the Internet or on Local Area Net-
works are widely known. The primary threats related to network transmission are
briefly described below.
Sniffing (or eavesdropping) is possible in some low-level communication protocols.
It is a significant threat to confidentiality of the transmission.
Spoofing is possible for each protocol commonly used on the Internet. Depending
on the protocol, it allows impersonation of a host or gives an attacker the capaci-
ty to deceive authentication methods based on the source address of the packets
or even allows a third host to become an agent between two other hosts, and to
fully control connections. Different varieties of spoofing threaten all aspects of
secure data transmission.
Session take over (or session hijacking) allows an attacker to steal an already
established TCP/IP session. Since authentication is usually performed only on
initialization of a connection, this is a significant threat to authenticity of the
transmitted data [4, 6].
One may conclude that standard network protocols cannot provide the security
level mentioned above. Therefore, cryptography algorithms [13] are applied in order
to ensure the desired level of security. Secure connections are enabled by another
protocol layer created over the standard network protocols. For secure connection
establishment asymmetric cryptography (Figure 1) algorithms are used by entities
to verify the identity of the peer. Digital certificates are the basis of the authenti-
cation process. Thereafter asymmetric cryptography is used to establish symmetric
session key(s) for the connection. Data transmitted over the secure connection are
encrypted with the symmetric session key(s). Asymmetric keys are used to ensure
authenticity and integrity of transmitted information by the use of digital signatures.
The latter are computed as the hash of data being sign encrypted with the private
key of the sender. Both data and signature are transmitted to the destination. The
receiver decrypts the signature with the public key of the sender and verifies if the
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hash matches the received information (see Figure 2). Nowadays, asymmetric cryp-






















































Signing message Verifying signature
Fig. 2. Creation and verification of a digital signature
Security for Grid applications is also achieved by the use of cryptography. How-
ever, the issues that we encounter in Grid environments are significantly more com-
plex; therefore they are not addressed by any standard solution. Most of the exist-
ing Grid security solutions have roots in the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [9],
which is based on public key cryptography. In order to better define Grid security
requirements and find appropriate solutions, the Global Grid Forum Grid Security
Working Group [12] was formed. Since there are various existing concepts and well
tested security solutions addressing different security issues, the GSI WG decided
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to develop a security solution for Grid systems on the basis of existing ones. Thus,
cryptography is used to ensure security in the Grid environment.
The GSI solution based on cryptography responds to Grid security requirements.
However, communication efficiency is decreased by the secured connections layer.
Cryptography algorithms require additional computations, integrity and authentici-
ty protection assumes transmission of additional data over the network. Therefore
securing transmitted data strongly affects efficiency of the transmission.
Asymmetric cryptography algorithms are significantly more CPU-intensive then
symmetric ones due to the more complex mathematical operations and longer keys
required. However, they solve the problem of encryption key distribution that is
crucial for secure communication protocols exploited by GSI. Therefore asymmetric
keys are used for secure connection establishment, but whenever possible, they are
substituted by a symmetric session key(s). Digital signatures are computed using
the hash of transmitted information in order to minimize overhead introduced by
the use of asymmetric cryptography algorithms. Thus, more efficient algorithms are
used to transmit data over the secure connection.
Data transmission secured by means of cryptography algorithms used by GSI
introduces additional overhead. However, we should notice that connection estab-
lishment is significantly more resource-consuming than transmission itself. These
overheads have a direct impact on the efficiency of the tools used on the Grid. As
an example let us consider the OCM-G – CrossGrid monitoring system for interac-
tive applications, which is intended to facilitate the development of complex Grid
applications [5].
The OCM-G is designed as an on-line monitoring system capable of monitoring
and manipulating application processes in real time. It is an infrastructure that is
shared between numerous users and applications.
It seems obvious that security is an important issue for the Monitoring System.
Security weakness of its infrastructure would strongly affect the security of shared
resources and computations. However, efficiency of the monitoring infrastructure
created by the OCM-G is no less important. The latencies between the user and his
application processes should be appropriate for on-line monitoring. GSI was chosen
to secure the monitoring system since it fits the Grid environment and provides
a means to match the security requirements of OCM-G.
We are aware of the dependency between security and efficiency of the trans-
mission, and therefore we decided to perform experiments in order to evaluate the
overhead resulting from using GSI. The aim is to determine the communication
efficiency attainable at a required security level.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we describe three experiments performed in order to evaluate resource
consumption and other undesirable effects of cryptographic algorithms at different
stages of a connection.
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The security requirements of Grid applications may vary. Therefore we per-
formed tests with the following security levels:
Level Description
CLEAR no security mechanisms were enabled,
AUTH authentication and authorization were performed
upon connection establishment,
PROTECT authenticity and integrity of transmitted data
via digital signatures were guaranteed,
ENCRYPT transmitted data were encrypted.
Note that stronger security levels includes all aspects of weaker levels.
We found it convenient to use two different execution environments for two cir-
cumstances. Experiments concerning transmission overhead were carried out on
slower machines, where it was easier to observe the CPU time usage. DoS vulnera-
bility tests required a large cluster of machines, while the high computing capability
of particular nodes did not make the interpretation of the results difficult.
All test programs were implemented using Globus_IO – a communication library
that is part of the Globus Toolkit 2 [11]. Globus_IO implements the GSI security
solutions and is designed specifically for Grid systems.
3.1 Transmission Overhead
The first experiment we performed in order to estimate the transmission overhead
was related to secure data transfer. The aim of this test was to evaluate the overhead
resulting from the security mechanisms applied, depending on the security level used
during data transmission.
In order to perform the experiment, two short programs were written: sender
and responder. Responderwas designed to receive data and to send it back. Sender
was designed to send data to the responder and to receive it back.
All measurements were performed on the sender side. Each measurement was
started before connection was established and stopped when all data were received;
thus all results concern two transmissions: from sender to responder and from
responder to sender. For the measurements that required transmission of multiple
data packets, the connection was established once. Thereafter multiple transmissions
were performed through this connection.
The experiment was performed on a PC cluster. The sender process was exe-
cuted on an Intel Celeron 300MHz machine, the responder on an Intel PIII 600MHz
machine. The hosts were connected with 100Mbps switched LAN.
The measurement was conducted by transmitting data through the network
between sender and responder. Sender measured the CPU time for the two-way
transmission. The measurement was carried out for different quantities of 100-byte
packets with different security levels applied. The results are presented in Figure 3.




























Fig. 3. Results of the security overhead test
We may notice a linear relationship between CPU time and quantity of packets
for each security level; however, for higher security levels the CPU time increases
faster. In order to estimate the overhead resulting from the proposed solution, we
present an average CPU time for the discussed security levels (see Table 1).






Table 1. Average CPU time for 100-byte packet
3.2 Transmission Time and Packet Size
The previous experiment was performed for fixed-size packets. Subsequently, we
studied the dependency between transmission time and size of the transmitted
packets. We should expect it is more efficient to transmit data in large packets.
For this experiment we used the sender and the responder processes configured
as before. We performed two-way transmission of 10,000 packets of different sizes,
and measured CPU time consumption. In order to compare results, we computed
the average CPU time required to transmit 100 bytes for each size of the packet.
The results of the experiment are presented in Figure 4.






























Fig. 4. Size of the packets and CPU time consumption for different security levels
3.3 Susceptibility to Denial of Service Attacks
As mentioned before, establishment of a secure connection consumes more resources
due to the complex asymmetric-cryptography operations performed. Thus we can
conclude that servers may not be able to simultaneously establish numerous secure
connections. This will also make the port listening for secure connections more
vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks.
The aim of the experiment described below is to estimate the vulnerability of
the secure connections server to DoS attacks. We try to find the practical limit of
secure connections that can be handled by the server, to verify the results of server
overload and to estimate the number of connections that can be safely handled.
In order to perform the experiment we implemented two short programs: client
and server. Server listened for connections, and after a connection request arrived,
it logged the time of the arrival. Then it tried to establish a connection and logged
the time of establishment or failure. Client first waited until a specified clock
time and tried to establish connection with the specified host on a specified port.
The start time and connection establishment or failure time were logged. In this
scenario, the client was the intended attacker while the server was the “victim”
of this attack.
The experiment was performed on a PC cluster with machines equipped with two
2.4GHz Intel Xeon processors and 1GB RAM each. Eighteen machines connected
with 100Mbps switched LAN were involved in the test.
The experiment consisted of a simulated Denial of Service attack that was per-
formed by clients to server. Seventeen hosts requested connections to the server,
which ran on the remaining host. The clocks of the hosts were synchronized with
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the NTP protocol [14], thus we were able to achieve the requisite accuracy while
triggering clients.
During the experiment we increased the number of client processes on each
node until we reached the maximum number of incoming connections per second that
could be handled by server. The experiment was performed for the connections
with different security levels applied. We present the maximum number of connec-
tions that were requested in one second and properly established (Table 2). We have
observed that in the case of connection failure client returned a Connection timed
out error.
Connections
Security Requested Established Failed
level Overall In 1 second Overall In 1 second
AUTH 901 899 881 30 20
PROTECT 901 894 871 30 30
ENCRYPT 901 896 897 30 4
Table 2. Results of the simulated DoS attack
Connections
Security Requested Established Failed
level Overall In 1 second Overall In 1 second
CLEAR 1700 1692 1700 1691 0
Table 3. TCP connections established in one second
We did not attempt to establish results for a DoS attack for clear text trans-
missions since a successful DoS attack using the raw TCP protocol may strongly
affect the server availability. We do present results that show that clear text con-
nection establishment is significantly more efficient than the one required for secure
transmission (Table 3).
4 CONCLUSION
The first experiment showed that the average CPU time required to perform data
transmission with integrity checking is over four times greater than the time required
for a clear text transmission. Transferring data via encrypted connections requires
even more resources: the average CPU time for this connection is over seven times
greater than for clear text ones. However, we should realize that the CPU time
required to transmit 100 bytes through the most resource consuming connection is
on the order of 1/10 millisecond even though we did not perform the experiment
on particularly fast hardware. Thus, even the connection that requires the most
computing resources should not cause significant overhead, neither in CPU time
consumption nor in the delay of message delivery.
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While designing the security policy of a system we should consider which security
level is really required for data transfer. From the results of the first test we can see
that the differences in CPU time consumption between particular levels of security
are significant. Therefore, it is desirable to restrict the security level only to that
which is really required by the system.
Considering the results of the second experiment we may conclude that the size
of the transmitted packet is significant for transmission efficiency. The average CPU
time required to transmit 100 bytes significantly decreases with packet size increasing
to the size of 1.5 kilobytes. Thus, as expected, it is more efficient to transmit a small
number of large packets than a huge number of small packets. This is also true for
raw TCP connections, however, this factor seems to be more significant for secure
ones.
The establishment of a secure connection is an exceptionally resource-consuming
process. Therefore, servers can handle fewer simultaneously incoming secured con-
nections than raw TCP ones. Also, it is important to notice that a client that cannot
establish a connection with an overloaded server receives the Connection timed out
network error. Thus it is possible to deduce the reason for which the connection
could not be established.
5 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have shown the results of three experiments which tested the effi-
ciency of different aspects of connection secured with cryptographic algorithms. We
have evaluated the overhead resulting from secure data transfer as well as connection
establishment.
It can be seen from the presented tests that applying security mechanisms to
secure network connections results in significant overhead. The increase of CPU time
required to transmit protected information in comparison to clear data transfer,
as well as increased vulnerability of secured connections to a DoS attack cannot
be overlooked. Security offered by asymmetric cryptography algorithms results in
significant resource consumption.
For the reasons described above, the security mechanisms applied to data trans-
mission in a system should always match the real security requirements. It seems
advantageous to introduce an optional lower security level for less vulnerable net-
work connections whenever permitted by the system security policy, especially when
we desire highly efficient data transmission.
The experiments we have performed prove that the security overhead is ac-
ceptable for the OCM-G monitoring system. However, we realize that they do not
provide complete information concerning the efficiency of GSI-secured network com-
munication. Depending on requirements of particular Grid systems their developers
may require results of specific experiments conducted in specific circumstances. Pos-
sible tests may concern e.g. details about wall time overhead during authentication,
encryption and transmission or network overhead resulting from the necessity of
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sending additional data required by security protocols. Therefore we found it ad-
vantageous to work out an analytic method enabling estimation of security overhead
on the basis of a model of the considered distributed system. Thus, developers would
be able to verify the efficiency of their applications without performing complex ex-
periments.
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